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The Residue of Uniqueness 
Willard McCarty  
Abstract: »Was von der Einzigartigkeit bleibt«. To build an argument for the 
supervening importance of agenda, I locate the digital humanities within the 
context of a central human predicament: the anxiety of identity stemming from 
the problematic relation of human to non-human, both animal and machine. I 
identify modelling as the fundamental activity of the digital humanities and 
draw a parallel between it and our developing confrontation with the not-us. I 
then go on to argue that the demographics of infrastructure within the digital 
humanities, therefore in part its emphasis, is historically due to the socially in-
ferior role assigned to those who in the early years found para-academic em-
ployment in service to the humanities. I do not specify an agenda, rather con-
clude that modelling, pursued within its humane context, offers a cornucopia of 
agenda if only the “mind-forged manacles” of servitude’s mind-set can be bro-
ken. 
Keywords: agenda, digital, human, machine, animal, residue, sciences, hu-
manities. 
 
To agree that a machine can be intelligent is to open the door to one 
more Other. (…) We make this opening in terror and exhilaration – 
how much must we give up of ourselves; what will we gain? Pame-
la McCorduck, Machines Who Think (1979) 
What would it mean to give a logical consistency to the in-between? 
It would mean realigning with a logic of relation. For in-between, as 
such, is not a middling being but rather the being of the middle – the 
being of a relation. (…) it is the contingent effect of that which it 
conditions. Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual (2002) 
1. Agenda or Infrastructure? 
I answer Professor Thaller’s question, “Does the digital humanities have an 
agenda or constitute an infrastructure?”, by addressing each alternative in turn. 
First I connect the discipline’s fundamental activity – exploring cultural arte-
facts methodologically by building and reflecting on models of them1 – with an 
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1  By this notoriously polysemous term “modelling” I include both analytical modelling 
(McCarty 2005: 20-72) and simulation, by which I mean construction of models in order to 
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ongoing problem sufficiently basic to all the humanities that all have cause to 
engage with it. This problem is the widely, sometimes anxiously discussed 
possibility that in the light of scientific discoveries and inventions the distinc-
tion between human and not-human will soon be impossible to maintain.2 I 
want to show that what digital humanists do bears on this possibility and so to 
argue that an agenda for the field rooted in a shared concern for the human has 
the best chance for providing a fundamental rationale, not just an instrumental 
one. I then turn to infrastructure, arguing that although it is crucial for the dis-
ciplines and has proved useful in giving us an institutional foothold, it is quite 
secondary: a service we perform, not what we are for. 
I ask the reader’s patience. For long stretches of the first part the digital hu-
manities will go unmentioned. But this is necessary to prepare a place for it, or 
rather, to show the fitness of the place it already occupies, though perhaps 
unnoticed. Throughout, for convenience, I subsume under the term “digital 
humanities” all activities of computing within the humanities and interpretative 
social sciences from the conventional beginning with Roberto Busa in the mid 
1940s (Wisbey 1965, 222-5), ignoring the historically significant changes of 
name. I consider “digital humanities” a singular collective noun denoting a 
cohesible if not coherent although loose and open bundle of practices – an 
amalgam, as historian Michael Mahoney said of computer science (2011, 165). 
What makes the digital humanities cohesible, of course, is the potential for an 
agenda we are setting about to discover and develop from what has been hap-
pening these last many years. And so to the task. 
2. A Fearful Vision and Response to It 
My title, “The residue of uniqueness”, I borrow from the subtitle of an essay by 
sociobiologist Melvin Konner (1991). It alludes to the hotly debated question 
of whether humankind is unique among life-forms and beyond the reach of 
mechanism. Although this question or elements of it can be traced as far back 
as one wishes to go, most discussions of it begin with Descartes, who argued 
that animals were machines made of flesh and our own bodies likewise but 
invoked the power of reason to distinguish our kind (Sheehan 1991; Hahn 
                                                                                                                                
explore possible objects or behaviours unobserved or unobservable otherwise in the real 
world – “the one we … turn out to be in”, as Francis Sparshott has said (1990). I also qual-
ify both activities with Michael Polanyi’s idea that engagement with a model or simulation 
enables our attending from it in an act of tacit knowing so that we may attend to the mod-
elled entity or simulated phenomenon – until a breakdown of some kind occurs (Polanyi 
1983/1966; McCarty 2005: 43-5). 
2  Here I depend, as references will suggest, on the excellent collection of essays, Sheehan 
and Sosna, eds. 1991, but also on a project of the National Humanities Center, On the Hu-
man (onthehuman.org/), in which I participated, and for which I owe a debt of gratitude to 
the President of the NHC, Geoffrey Harpham. 
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1991). Since then, scientific research, technological invention and the sharp 
tools of historians and philosophers have steadily chipped away at categorical 
differences said to separate humans from both animals and machines, to the 
point at which it would seem that drawing a line between us and not-us is at 
best a temporary act. “It would seem”, Konner concludes,  
that we are sorted to a pulp, caught in a vise made, on the one side, of the in-
creasing power of evolutionary biology … and, on the other, of the relentless 
duplication of human mental faculties by increasingly subtle and complex ma-
chines. 
He asks, “So what is left of us?” (1991, 120).  
I quote Konner for the literally reductive imagery of a human space being 
squeezed to a residue as computational and biological explanations advance on 
it, not for his argument (whose sociobiological detail is beyond my compe-
tence) nor the answer he gives to his own question. His answer – that “only we 
combine the emotions and the life cycle drama of the animal world with a fully 
empowered reflective and communicative faculty” (120) – I put aside not just 
because his is one of many, rather more because they all assume the validity of 
the question. I grant that “what marks out all humans from other animals is a 
question that can be, and to some extent is being, determined by physical anth-
ropology and evolutionary psychology” (Lloyd 2010, 211). I also grant the 
possibility, anticipated by Alan Turing more than 60 years ago, that one day it 
may prove rather difficult to tell the difference between what we have made 
with computing and what we think we are. Indeed, it seems likely that for a 
very long time, perhaps since a group of hominids became sapiens if not earli-
er, we have been becoming what we make and making what we become. But 
more on that later. 
In computer science, with its emphasis on seeing what can be done, the talk 
is often of how, with increasing success, a “problem space” is heuristically 
explored (Newell 1980), hence by implication incrementally reducing what’s 
left over, which tends to be regarded as uninteresting, insignificant or tempo-
rary. To those scientists who in C. P. Snow’s words feel “the future in their 
bones” (1998/1959, 10) there would seem to be no reason not to be confident 
that one day soon a scientific “theory of mind” will trump the metaphorical 
habit of mind characteristic of the humanities. Such a theory, Alan Newell 
declared more than 20 years ago, “will entrain an indefinite sequence of 
shocks… through all our dealings with ourselves. And the humanities might 
just be caught in the maelstrom” (1991, 195). Not everyone invokes the apoca-
lyptic language of an End Time, but the message running through the history of 
such talk up to now is with Newell in suggesting that in time human uniqueness 
will prove untenable.  
In an essay in the same collection as Newell’s, Sherry Turkle predicted that 
computing then in development would put to rest the “romantic reactions” 
ordinary people tend to have to AI (1991). That this has not happened, that the 
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shocks Newell spoke of are still thought to be foreshadowed if not in delivery 
would seem to be robustly confirmed by the February 2009 meeting of artificial 
intelligence researchers at Asilomar, California, to discuss “potential long-term 
societal influences of AI research and development”. Echoing Newell but in 
somewhat more cautious language, these scientists were particularly concerned 
about “disruptive social changes” that could follow from “computational sys-
tems [achieving] ‘human-level’ abilities along a variety of dimensions, or [sur-
passing] human intelligence in a variety of ways” (Horvitz and Selman 2009). 
News about this meeting may have been exaggerated,3 but the fact that leading 
AI researchers were concerned enough to call the meeting tells the tale: they 
were, and I suppose still are, worried. My point is not that Turkle was wrong or 
premature, or that something is coming we had better prepare for, rather it’s the 
worrying I take interest in. This worrying is worth far more to us than to be 
treated either as romantic reaction or as premonition.  
3. An Aside on the Digital Humanities 
But what does all this have to do with the digital humanities? Like much of the 
humanities as a whole, the field has not been anywhere near the front line of 
the action I depict. Since the beginning it has kept far back, absorbed with 
technical concerns, with its place in the academic world and with the enormity 
of its task (for all the humanities and human sciences are affected). Those in 
the field who have noticed this enormity have, I suppose, been understandably 
bemused. Hence little if any ecological awareness has emerged within the 
digital humanities despite the fact that abundant information about relevant 
work in the sciences and beyond has been in circulation from before its begin-
nings: as raw news and excited commentary in the mass media, in novels, films 
and throughout the creative arts and in the reflections of public intellectuals and 
cultural critics.4 Given the isolation of the digital humanities and the newness 
of both computing and its inherently experimental methodology to the humani-
ties, we can hardly be surprised to find complaints of stagnation and theoretical 
poverty: from the philosopher and linguist Margaret Masterman’s complaint of 
“no new theoretic vision” in 1962; Louis Milic’s in 1966, of a startling lack of 
imagination and failure to think afresh; Susan Wittig’s in 1978, of a stultifying, 
positivistic idea of text taken for granted; Rosanne Potter’s, summarizing a 
range of views in 1991, of the need for theories; Jerome McGann’s in 2004, of 
failure to touch the central concern of the interpretative disciplines, i.e. inter-
pretation; David Hoover’s in 2007, of the forces that have suppressed interest 
                                                             
3  Markoff 2009, which “touched off a mini-firestorm” of public reaction (Wellman 2009). 
4  See e.g. Hayles 1999, a very useful though over-determined account. 
 28
in text-analysis; to Stephen Ramsay’s hopeful response to the problem in 2011, 
Reading Machines: Toward an Algorithmic Criticism.5  
In his Introduction to the published proceedings of the 1962 Burg Warten-
stein conference, The Use of Computers in Anthropology, Dell Hymes wrote 
that “the development of the electronic computer… [presents] a challenge that 
must be met, yet whose full nature is not yet generally grasped” (1965, 15). 
Much has happened in these last 50 years, but the fact that Hymes’ words could 
be spoken today and still ring true is a wake-up call for the digital humanities: 
to wake up to the possibilities of its situation among the disciplines and to wake 
up to the fact that by Turing’s design computing demands a perpetual waking 
up, that is, a modelling of as well as with the indefinitely plural, reconfigurable 
scheme for acting and thinking confusingly denoted by the singular term “the 
computer”.  
As to the first waking up, I think the inescapable conclusion is that lacking 
an agenda-awareness of its own the digital humanities has been almost entirely 
an instrument in the support of work that happens elsewhere by other means. 
That the great changes in humanities scholarship have come upon us unawares, 
a result not of deliberate innovation as chiefly of simple access to quantities of 
information,6 is no fault, but the fact that these changes have not been studied 
by the digital humanities is indicative of its immaturity and lack of outward 
reach into the disciplines that could help. Ramsay may well be on the right 
track, but why after more than 60 years is the digital humanities still in ap-
proach? Why are we having this debate? 
This is where I begin, with the question of where to find a connection to the 
humanities that is not merely between servant and served. And for that reason I 
turn to the analogy for which I have been preparing: as the problem of the 
human, so the problem of human artefacts. Let us say, as so many are saying 
now, that the humanity of homo sapiens is a matter of what is left over after 
biological and computational models have done their best. If we think this way, 
then it seems inescapable to treat the humanity of human artefacts likewise, as 
a residue, and to construct the digital humanities as a humane pursuit orientated 
to illumining not eliminating it. If what we do with computers is to model these 
artefacts, to see how far our ideas of them go and what this going teaches us 
about them and about a computing adequate to the challenges they present, 
then we can go the other direction as well, back to the bigger question, the 
                                                             
5  For the complaints also see Fortier 1993; for a survey up to the early 21C, Rommel 2004, 
and for a diagnosis of the central problem of interpretative disciplines, McGann 2004a; 
since then, Juola 2008; McCarty 2010; McCarty 2012a. The problem identified by these 
and several other publications has not been comprehensively studied since Potter. 
6  Considering the question of social impact, Joseph Weizenbaum makes the point that the 
important changes brought about “by any pervasive new technology” are not those we tend 
to notice but “the much more subtle and ultimately much more important side effects” 
(1972, 609). 
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question all humane disciplines share, and think of it in the same way, as mod-
elling the human and modelling human processes of thought, leading to results 
whose shock has real therapeutic value because it is provocation to re-model. 
In both cases attention turns to the residue, and as McGann said of that which 
escapes markup, what we find is “the hem of a quantum garment” (2004a, 201; 
cf. e.g. Matt 14, 36), the touching of which brings about a real revolution.  
The complaints which run through the professional literature establish that 
something has been amiss but do not take us far enough into the nature of the 
problem. They do not connect it with the historical contexts in which the digital 
humanities have developed. For that we need the subtler clues to unease which 
surfaced in the professional literature especially during the early period, up to 
the introduction of the Web. These are found, for example, in expressions of 
fear (that “the” computer may put scholars out of a job or is otherwise a threat 
to scholarship) and reassurance (that it won’t and isn’t); in insistent proclama-
tions of a great revolution spreading through the humanities under the banner 
of (positivistic) science; in reactions against that anticipated and much post-
poned revolution; and in the consistency with which computing is assigned to 
drudgery, and so to servitude (more about which later), with curious parallels to 
industrial production, employment and the curiously underspecified notion of 
leisure. I do not have scope here to examine these clues in detail, but suffice it 
to say that in their historical context they sum to an overall anxiety which de-
mands explanation. This anxiety is certainly matched by strong warnings from 
leading cultural critics and public intellectuals during the early period,7 but 
these also give evidence that a problem existed but do not tell us enough about 
what that problem was. The Cold War (1945-1991), the “electronic battlefield” 
of Vietnam and other sinister alliances of computing with what Dwight Eisen-
hower called the “military-industrial complex” certainly played a role (Whit-
field 1996; Edwards 1996; Eisenhower 1961). But the pall of these alliances 
did not discourage everyone uniformly – not at all, for example, the more ad-
venturous artists brilliantly at play nor the early enthusiasts in the digital hu-
manities.  
Is there is an explanation that goes beyond and is ultimately more positive 
and useful to the digital humanities than any of these or, for example, than the 
rage for Theory often fingered as the cause of stalled progress in literary com-
puting (cf. Hoover 2007)? What can we do with the facts we have in order to 
find out?  
                                                             
7  See e.g. Ellul 1964/1954; Mumford 1970 (with his series of four articles, “The Mega-
machine”, in The New Yorker from 24 to 31 October 1970; Leavis 1972/1970; Cousins 
1989. In all these the dichotomy of human vs. machine is quite explicit. 
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4. The Co-Evolution of Humans and Machines 
Let me illustrate by turning back to the wider history of the techno-sciences to 
consider a particular temporal sequence important to the digital humanities: 
from Turing’s landmark paper of 1936 on the Entscheidungsproblem to his 
paper of 1950 on artificial intelligence. In the 1936 paper, he like many scien-
tists anchors his reasoning in a metaphor – curiously, since he is writing not for 
the wider public but for fellow mathematicians. Thus, he writes, “We may 
compare a man in the process of computing a real number to a machine which 
is only capable of a finite number of conditions….” (231). He then leaves the 
metaphor behind. But the abstract machine he invents to assist his proof, con-
ceived in the image of a mathematical bureaucrat (Agar 2003, 69-74), later 
inspires the neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch and mathematical logician 
Walter Pitts to design their model of the human brain as a Turing Machine 
(1943). Two years later mathematician John von Neumann adopts the 
McCulloch-Pitts brain in his architectural sketch of the Electronic Discrete 
Variable Automatic Computer (EDVAC, 1945), as von Neumann notes and 
McCulloch later comments (1988/1961, 9). The neurophysiological vocabulary 
that peppers von Neumann’s description of hardware is unmistakable. Five 
years later, in the 1950 paper, Turing famously asserts that once we can no 
longer tell the difference of intelligence between human and digital computers, 
we will have to grant that there is none. At this point technical and existential 
concerns connect, as with hindsight we can see anticipated by Jonathan Swift’s 
satirical genius in Gulliver’s Travels.8 
Such is the chronology from Turing 1936 to Turing 1950. But what we see 
historically is more than mere chronology. It is a recursive process of co-
evolutionary development:9 from Turing’s bureaucrat to a rigorous machine; 
from his machine to a machine-like brain; from the brain to a design for hard-
ware; and from that hardware to the human-machine dilemma in the form we 
now know. The Turing Test (as it came to be called) is an expression of it. It 
continues to this day in machine-to-human/human-to-machine mirroring in-
stantiated, for example, in computing become the dominant model of mind and 
in human neurophysiology modelled in the SyNAPSE Project, which (accord-
                                                             
8  See Kenner 2005/1968 and Harris 1987, esp. the former, for brilliant commentary on the 
importance of Swift’s satire for the questions taken up here. 
9  I use the term “co-evolutionary” advisedly, with cautious metaphorical intent. Mazlish 1993 
uses “co-evolution” in the subtitle but doesn’t devote substantial discussion to the term; see 
pp. 229-33. See esp. Rosenkopf and Tushman 1994; Baum and Singh 1994; and Yates 
1993, who defines the term “to denote contemporaneous and interacting developments of a 
technology and its use…” (5 fn 9). This is more than Meyer-Drawe’s “mirror of machines” 
would suggest (2007) and different from the cybernetic process denoted by “feedback” 
(Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow 1943: 19) and “feed-forward” (Richards 1951: 54), 
whose purpose is homeostasis, though this kind of thinking does proceed from theorizing 
interrelated things as systems. 
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ing to IBM’s press release) has produced a chip that duplicates human neuronal 
architecture. The chip isn’t programmed, its developers say, rather it observes 
and learns.10 Again, never mind the facts (though their solidity is important and 
IBM no fool); mind the rhetoric: we think like the machine we have made in 
the image of ourselves; the machine thinks like us as we have come to think 
about ourselves in the image of the machine. A house of mirrors. 
The co-evolutionary process of interest here is widely attested. Consider the 
following three examples from technological history before the digital humani-
ties.  
The first is the 19th-century analogical relationship between the human 
nervous and circulatory systems on the one hand and electrical communication 
and railroad networks on the other. As Laura Otis and others have shown, each 
shaped the development of ideas about the other.11 Thus in 1854, about a cen-
tury before “giant brain” became synonymous with the digital computer,12 a 
telegraph company’s head offices could be called “the great brain… the nerv-
ous system of Britain”.13 
Sometimes (as Otis documents) the morphological mapping of self onto 
world and vice versa was consciously metaphorical, but often not: one suspects 
that the phrase “sentient wire”, used e.g. by Edward Bright of the British and 
Irish Telegraph Society in 1867 (v), simply declared what the telegraph was 
commonly thought to be. (Metaphors are like that: first consciously figurative, 
then dormant in descriptions.) Ernst Kapp, who coined the term “philosophy of 
technology” about the same time, argued in effect that such mapping is what 
we tend always to do, whether consciously or not: “in the tool man continually 
produces himself”,14 he wrote. I will return to this in a moment. 
My second example is cybernetics, which arose out of wartime efforts to de-
sign control systems that would match human physiological response move for 
move.15 Arturo Rosenbleuth, co-author of a foundational paper in cybernetics 
(Rosenbleuth, Wiener and Bigelow 1943), drew from the French physiologist 
                                                             
10  IBM’s press release is at <www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/35251.wss> (24/3/12); 
note also current brain-chip interfacing devices, for which see Vassanelli et al 2012. 
11  See Otis 2002 and 2001; Morus 2000; Hochfelder 2001, 308-13; Gleick 2011, 125-67. See 
also Borck 2012; Sappol 2006 and von Debschitz and von Debschitz 2009 for Fritz Kahn’s 
“dream anatomy”. 
12  A hugely popular phrase promoted by Berkeley 1949, opposed in vain by many computer 
scientists and manufacturers of machines: see Armer 1963; McCorduck 1979, 173, who 
notes the opposing phrase “giant morons”; cf. Andree 1958, 2, “A computer is not a giant 
brain…. It is a remarkably fast and phenomenally accurate moron.” 
13  Andrew Wynter, English physician, q. Morus 2000, 459. For the apparently common 
phrase, “sentient wire” see Bright 1867, v. 
14  “dass der Mensch in dem Werkzeug stets nur sich selbst producirt” (Kapp 1877, 45; cf. 
Mitcham 1994, 20-4). 
15  For entry-points into cybernetics, see Dupuy 2000/1994; Heims 1993; Hayles 1999, chap-
ters 3-6; and cf. Mindell 2002. 
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Claude Bernard’s fundamental idea of the milieu intérieur of biological organ-
isms (Gross 1998, 384), thus emphasizing the self-contained nature of the 
cybernetic model. But in constructing it the cyberneticists reproduced the hu-
man in a particular and partial way, so when they reflected it back as an image 
of the human, humanity was identified with a machine-in-a-new-sense, in Eve-
lyn Fox Keller’s words, a machine “endowed with its own purpose… abso-
lutely autonomous, capable of constructing itself, maintaining itself, reproduc-
ing itself” (1991, 85). Our ideas of human autonomy would thus seem suspect. 
Finally, consider Warren Weaver’s account of his and Claude Shannon’s 
mathematical theory of information, which begins in a schematic of “How… 
men communicate, one with another” (Weaver 1949, 11), becomes a mathe-
matical design, is translated into circuitry and finally returns as an authoritative 
explanation for human communication.16 The Shannon-Weaver model certainly 
has its roots in earlier technologies such as telegraphy, but its adhesiveness as a 
way of thinking about media (as conduits rather than environments) strongly 
suggests the co-evolutionary recursiveness for which I am arguing. 
5. The Techno-Scientific Context 
If as Kapp said, “in the tool man continually produces himself”, then what he 
produces is more precisely a model of himself, a simplified and partial thing 
that instantiates some aspects of human nature as he understands it and can be 
accommodated within the particular technology. This, the history suggests, 
then tends to be taken as a true image to which the beholder begins to conform. 
The trauma I want to examine is from the seeming inevitability of a degenera-
tive loop which the co-evolutionary process suggests. 
A more promising way of considering this loop is to think of it in terms of 
what we might call the psychological reception of science, that is, of the tacit as 
well as explicit dimensions of the images of the human communicated as scien-
tific fact. Weaver’s popularization in Scientific American (1949) is a good 
example: in essence human communication, and so the human performed in 
communication, being nothing more than passing of pre-formed messages 
through a certain amount of interference and distortion to a recipient. Informa-
tion, as it came to be known. 
The Shannon-Weaver “transmission model” (Chandler 1994) is thus an in-
stance of what neuropsychologist Richard L. Gregory has called the “exorcisms 
of mind” from science, though here mind is not completely exorcised, only 
shoved off-stage (1981, 96ff). Other instances are, for example, the Cartesian 
                                                             
16  See Chandler 1994 on the “transmission model” of communication; note Sebeok 1963 and 
cf. McCarty 2012b. 
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“machinery of the body”17 and the one central to my concerns, the computa-
tional model of mind rapidly convergent on the brain, with the promise not 
only of mingling physiology and philosophy but, in its most radical form, of 
erasing the distinction altogether, and so leaving no residue of mind. In physi-
cist Steven Weinberg’s unminced words, the end result of progressive exorcism 
is a view of nature (including homo sapiens) “as impersonal and free of human 
values as the rules of arithmetic” (1974, 43). This is shocking to be sure, but it 
becomes culturally intelligible, as we will see, when we look more closely at 
the language he and others use to declare such freedom. We cannot simply 
wave this language away as accommodation to the scientifically underedu-
cated. “For men believe that their reason controls words”, Francis Bacon wrote 
in the Novum Organum (1620); “but it is also true that words… turn their force 
back on the understanding…”18 He was particularly concerned with the under-
standing of scientists. 
Weinberg’s is one of many reductive attacks of the sciences on what biolo-
gist Jacques Monod has called “the anthropocentric illusion” (1972/1970, 47). 
These attacks have a long history. In the early 20th Century their lineage was 
famously identified by Sigmund Freud in a shortlist of great outrages against 
deleterious self-love: Copernican cosmology, Darwinian evolution and his own 
psychoanalysis (Freud 1920a; 1920b). But Freud’s list of therapeutic shocks is 
radically incomplete, not only because such shocks have always been happen-
ing, but also because the list is indefinitely extensible by the very nature of the 
scientific enterprise. It is also, in its therapeutic intent, at one with the scientific 
tradition going back at least to the 17th Century. Both Bacon and Galileo, for 
example, spoke of scientific method as a defence against what Bacon called 
“the sciences as one would”19 – i.e. fanciful or capricious knowledge tainted by 
human weakness and corruption of mind, among which faults self-love is basic. 
In historian Alastair Crombie’s words, science for them was a corrective, re-
storative force: “the moral enterprise of freedom for the enquiring mind … a 
therapeutic experience offering perhaps the greatest moral contribution of 
science to mankind.”20 
We now know that the idea of secular science as a rejection of religion “has 
almost no place in the early modern world” (Reeves 2009, 61). Thanks to the 
work of several scholars21 we know that early-modern science succeeded be-
                                                             
17  The title of Carlson and Johnson 1938, a very popular textbook in physiology, 5th edn. 
1961 (the book I used in school). 
18  Bacon 2000/1620. “Credunt enim homines, rationem suam verbis imperare. Sed fit etiam ut 
verba vim suam super intellectum retorqueant et reflectant….” (I.59) 
19  “id quod generat ad quod vult scientias”, in Novum Organum, I. xlix. 
20  Crombie 1994: 8; for Bacon also see 1208-9 and 1572-86. 
21  In addition to Crombie 1994 and Reeves 2009 see Gaukroger 2006, Harrison 2007, Cor-
neau 2011 and, as background, Delumeau 1990/1983. Harrison, for example, argues that 
“the protocols that Bacon sought to inaugurate in the realm of the sciences may be regarded 
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cause of “its association with religion, rather than any attempt to disassociate 
itself from religion” (Gaukroger 2006, v). Thus in their preoccupation with 
human cognitive weaknesses, faith in the corrective discipline of experiment 
and moral function of science, Galileo and Bacon were of their time: their 
science was formed by religious purposes for ends we must recognize as reli-
gious, though in a sense that now takes work to recover. But thanks to Freud 
we know that such preoccupation, however secularized, is ours as well. The 
anxiety persists. With it, made problematic precisely because of the moral 
tradition within which it is articulated, is a conviction that places faith in a 
regimen and methodology for obtaining reliable knowledge. As we say, or used 
to say, these standards may seem God-given, but their origins are more com-
plex, interesting and contingent than can be accounted for by reference to an 
absolute. But I am not taking a cheap shot at science, rather wanting to estab-
lish a continuity in the concern for weaknesses we still have and strengths we 
can still acquire in spite of them.  
My point, however, is more that the argument from human weakness applies 
recursively to the arguing of it: thus the extreme dogmatic distrust of all human 
constructions, and so the passion to strip away desirous imagination from 
scientific results, or to relegate it to the as yet unconquered periphery of the 
real. Scientist and historian Evelyn Fox Keller illustrates by quoting Monod’s 
image of man become, as he says, “like a gypsy… on the boundary of an alien 
world; a world that is deaf to his music, and as indifferent to his hopes as it is 
to his suffering or his crimes” (Monod 1972/1970, 160). There is energy in 
these words, a kind of melancholic glee, which makes the alienation all the 
more shocking. Quoting Weinberg as above Keller points out that “this rhetoric 
goes beyond impersonality: nature becomes uncaring and ‘hostile,’ traits that 
are impersonal in a quite personal sense”. She quotes Weinberg’s astonishingly 
arrogant view that the world we know is “a more-or-less farcical outcome of a 
chain of accidents reaching back to the first three minutes” of the universe 
(Keller 1991, 87f.). Although no one would say that hostility and farce are 
scientific terms, their use exemplifies the way in which recommended cultural 
norms are, as Keller says, read covertly, through unexamined language, into 
natural law. Indeed, the very phrase “natural law” tells the tale, of nature cov-
ertly personified as an absolute judge,22 thus made as Keller says, “impersonal 
in a quite personal sense”. “In this way,” she concludes with Bacon, “through 
                                                                                                                                
as a parallel sacramental system aimed at the restoration of corrupted Adamic abilities…. 
For this reason Bacon could see his role in sacerdotal terms, establishing the scientific ritu-
als that would minister to and restore fallen human intellectual capabilities…” (2003: 171 
and ff.). 
22  “Paralleling political changes”, Raymond Williams has noted, “nature was altered from an 
absolute to a constitutional monarch, with a new kind of emphasis on natural laws. Nature, 
in C18 and C19, was often in effect personified as a constitutional lawyer” (1983/1976: 
223). See also Daston and Stolleis 2008. 
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our inescapable reliance on language, even the most ardent efforts to rid natural 
law of cultural norms become subverted, and the machinery of life takes on not 
so much a life of its own as a life of our own” (1991, 100).  
6. The Usefulness of the Modern Inquisition 
One response to the dichotomy of human versus not-human is to say that the 
real problem is created by that versus, that the way forward lies somewhere 
between the polarized opposites. “There is a kind of awful magnetism to this 
opposition”, Lorraine Daston remarks: “it draws and bends other, quite distinct 
debates as if they were iron filings in a strong field of attractions and repul-
sions” (2010, 226). Though I can see the problem, I want to argue that sharp 
opposition, driving extremes to extremes, is useful. I will try to say what I 
mean by this in a moment. 
A quite different response to the human/not-human dichotomy has been 
worked out by Bruce Mazlish (1993) with reference to earlier work by Jerome 
Bruner (1956). Roughly, by their argument, the confrontations I have just re-
viewed become discoveries point-by-point that humanity is continuous with the 
world: not an alien outsider, as Weinberg would have it, but family – hence the 
comic structure, with total reunion in view.  
The story I am telling is in contrast not a comedy but a Bildungsroman in 
which polarization, opposition and conflict are essential to a great educational 
programme. Thus I return in spirit to Bacon’s, of reformation to knowledge of 
a better self. In his case this begins with belief in Adam’s cognitive abilities 
lost in the Fall of Man, as Harrison and others have argued. In our case it be-
gins in anxiety awakened by scientific research, which demands an existential 
refiguring of the human. To see Copernicus in this light now requires a strong 
act of the imagination, though it can be done, for example on a very dark night, 
when the Milky Way is visible. Darwin is easier, for example by reading Le-
muel Gulliver’s account of his confrontation with the young female Yahoo in 
heat, and all that followed. The Freudian menace is closer yet, whatever our 
tastes: careful, honest observation of oneself is sufficient to reveal it. For com-
puting nothing betters Marvin Minsky’s impish declaration that “The brain 
happens to be a meat machine”.23 Irrespective of his beliefs or anyone else’s, 
this is a provocation to confront what we see, or fear we see, ever more clearly 
in the mirror of artificial intelligence.  
In his brilliant book The Language Machine (1987) linguist Roy Harris 
quotes Joseph Weizenbaum’s question, “What is it about the computer that has 
brought the view of man as a machine to a new level of plausibility?”, then 
                                                             
23  A very widely quoted epithet: see esp McCorduck 1979, 70 (the title of Chapter 4); Turkle 
1991, 242; Jerome Lettvin in McCulloch 1988/1965, viii. 
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counters with the question he says Weizenbaum should have asked: “What is it 
about the view of man as a machine that has brought the computer to a new 
level of plausibility?” (Harris 1987, 95). The latter question is the more striking 
for a number of reasons – one of them surely that it invokes the old determinis-
tic fear that we have been squeezed to a hopeless residue. And this is why both 
are not just cogent but crucial. What matters for us, at the intersection of com-
puting and the humanities, is their simultaneous presence. If we are to remain 
honest we cannot deny technological progress to ever smarter machines, just as 
we cannot deny the explanatory power of mechanisms in biology; and – this is 
the crucial and most subtle demand – we cannot take cold refuge in an imag-
ined end to the uncertainty in which the two become one, since to posit that is 
to embrace a fallacy at once nihilistic and hubristic, hence deeply seductive. It 
is to assume that the human imagination will reach an ultimate limit and so 
become the last finite machine it invents.  
Whether we still live within the same Judeo-Christian mythological enve-
lope as Bacon, putting the shocks of techno-science to the service of a once and 
future identity,24 is a question well beyond the scope of this essay. Help from 
several disciplines, anthropology included, is needed. For now, however, I put 
the question aside, assuming that we have no other reasonable choice than to 
come to terms with what research in the sciences is showing us, shockingly. 
But, I argue, we have a choice other than to capitulate or hide. We can pay 
attention and reform. We can re-model. 
In summary, then and again, my argument: that what we in the digital hu-
manities primarily do – build and reflect methodologically on computational 
models of cultural artefacts – is but a specific and technical form of confronting 
that essential residue of humanity left over after rational explanation has done 
its best. The digital humanities, that is, not only should be borrowing exten-
sively from the other disciplines of the humanities but can also reciprocate by 
locating the computational model of mind within the humanities as a powerful 
alternative way of thinking. One of its elementary lessons is how to “think like 
a computer” at will, as a powerful imaginative tool. That is where, I think, our 
agenda could take root. 
7. Agenda or Infrastructure? 
What, then, about infrastructure? This is the hard part for me, because I must 
move from talking about my research to talking about the lives of others and 
their place in the world. For infrastructure is the people who comprise it, whose 
                                                             
24  I paraphrase Viveiros de Castro’s characterization of societies that “attempt to remain, in a 
nontrivial sense, identical with themselves and coextensive with the cosmos… by means of 
devices that put difference in the service of identity” (1992, 4).  
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roles are defined far more than they are enabled by it. Or if it enables them, 
then it does so that they may act effectively in certain ways for a certain pur-
poses which they have not much liberty to determine. Infrastructure is, the 
OED tells us, “the subordinate parts of an undertaking; [its] substructure [or] 
foundation”. It is that which exists below stairs so that those above can better 
do what they wish to do. I have no argument against infrastructure; rather my 
argument is for its secondary status. Of course the digital humanities has to do 
with infrastructure; it has proved itself eminently capable of providing it, not 
just in the Text Encoding Initiative brilliantly but in numerous other projects as 
well. That’s good, a fine and noble public service, but it’s far from enough in 
the context of scholarship. 
The problem with advancing infrastructure as our focus is that in doing so 
we surrender the discipline to servitude. We identify the digital humanities at 
best as an institutional function vested in an academic unit, not an intellectual 
function belonging to a discipline. “New disciplines”, Mahoney has argued, 
“emerge by acquiring that autonomy” which allows them to set their own 
agenda (2011/1997, 130). If an emergent field doesn’t do that, if others tell its 
practitioners what to do, or if they do what they do because they think others 
want them to, or will love them for it, then the development of the field as a 
discipline is stifled. There is then simply no point to any discussion beyond 
technique, workmanship and professional responsibility – all fine virtues, but 
not intellectual ones. 
In the book from which I quoted earlier, The Language Machine, Roy Harris 
notes that, 
The equation ‘man = machine’ had long been preceded by the equation ‘ma-
chine = slave’. In Europe that earlier equation sprang from the social condi-
tions already established in the civilizations of Greece and Rome. The social 
history of Western technology is largely the history of replacing slaves by ma-
chines, machines being on the whole more efficient, more docile and less ex-
pensive…. [T]here was never any objection to an equation between the human 
and the mechanical in the Western tradition, as long as it was understood that 
the human side of the equation applied only to members of one (socially infe-
rior) class of human beings, and that the comparison related to the execution 
of tasks under the direction of a master. (1987, 96) 
Evidence for equating computer with slave or servant is abundant in Anglo-
phone publications from the incunabular years of computing, especially by 
implication in the typical assignment to drudgery, such as generating concor-
dances. In those early years a few practitioners and observers pointed out that 
the intellectual potential of computing was under threat from the “dangerously 
strong” temptation to bury it in servitude (Vickers 1971). By 1962, in the year 
of the meeting of anthropologists at Burg Wartenstein, it was clear at least to 
some that the promoters’ “boundless age of the computer” (Burck 1964), was 
in fact intellectually straitjacketed by the prevalent tendency to regard it, in 
Masterman’s words, “as a purely menial tool…[for] performing… a series of 
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irksome repetitive tasks… [performances of which] provoke no new theoretic 
vision” (1962, 38). And so the litany of complaints I mentioned earlier. While 
it is true that indifference is rapidly vanishing and that hardly anyone today can 
be found whose scholarship is unaffected and (I think we can say) unimproved 
by the use of digital resources, we need look no further than the current debate 
to see that those fifty-year-old criticisms still bite and give us some measure of 
how serious the problem of disciplinary servitude remains. Again let us ask, 
why are we having this debate and not another? 
Those of us with direct experience of academic computing in the early years 
will know the relegation-by-association that assigned a kind of institutional 
servitude to scholars on the academic periphery who found work using their 
humanistic training and technical skills to bring together the machinery of 
drudgery and the research of established humanists. By mediating interaction 
between conventional scholarship and digital methods, such people (I was one 
for a dozen years) were rewarded with invaluable insights into the interrela-
tionships between computing and the humanities but lacked the freedom to set 
their own agenda. In 1992 the Yale historian of religion, Jaroslav Pelikan, 
noticed the injustice to such scholars and others in like positions of servitude, 
arguing that the future of the university was at stake (1992, 62). In 1996 when I 
took up my job in London, there were few if any full-time appointments in the 
field. Since then, especially in the last few years, the digital humanities has 
become respectable if not trendy, but at a time when academic jobs of any kind 
are scarce. Hence Bethany Nowviskie’s admirable “alt-ac” movement.25  
As a result of the history I have just rapidly sketched a pronounced imbal-
ance in favour of infrastructuralists in the digital humanities may be observed. 
We should hardly be surprised that many of the scholars among them, not paid 
to think and act like scholars, have lost sight of that which infrastructure is for. 
An extreme though not isolated example is provided by a prominent member of 
a leading infrastructural digital initiative, who during a recent gathering of its 
governing committee was heard to say to a young lecturer, “We have no 
need… for career academics here”. The question to my mind isn’t who has a 
“real” job or which side of the wall it is on. Given how badly higher education 
has fared in recent decades, one must allow that a life of the mind outside the 
academy might be preferable, indeed recognise that such lives are being pro-
ductively and happily lived. The question, I want to say, is rather one of auton-
omy. But this is no simple matter. 
Comparing the civilizations of ancient Egypt and Greece, Richard Gregory 
notes that viable societies require a subtle balance between individuality, from 
which original, innovative thinking comes, and orthodox obedience to the 
group, which “inspires group loyalty and allows very large-scale cooperative 
                                                             
25  See <http://mediacommons.futureofthebook.org/alt-ac/> (12/3/12). 
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works (such as pyramid building) to be undertaken” (1981, 21). The humanities 
owe their orientation in this regard (and in many others) to Ancient Greece, for 
example to the surviving ideas if not the historical realities of Socrates’ life and 
death in Athens. Big Science, the Big Humanities following it and the infra-
structure that both require are in contrast Egyptian projects, pyramids, if you 
will. Looking out from my study onto an imagined scene of sweaty workers 
pulling heavy stones up steep inclines to build a sepulchre for the dead makes 
me glad to be where I am, but again the matter is not quite that simple.  
On the one hand, we so-called lone scholars are autonomous in the Russian 
poet Marina Tsvetaeva’s sense: we write in solitude for the benefit of others, in 
correspondence and communion with many both living and dead.26 Historian 
and philosopher of medicine Ludwik Fleck taught us that we all belong to and 
work within “thought-collectives” (1979/1935). And, we are increasingly be-
coming aware, no discipline, however independently it may set its agenda, is an 
island without urgent need of boats and a healthy economy of trade.  
On the other hand, how can a mind develop properly without the chance to 
go its own way, however stumblingly? In 1976 Roberto Busa, conventionally 
the first to do what we do, concluded a retrospective on his own great project, 
the Index Thomisticus, by saying that, 
if I consider the vast amount of human work demanded by processing texts of 
this size in this way, I think that such initiatives are better based on a strongly 
systemized team, supported by an institution able to keep alive its efficiency 
for decades (1976, 117). 
Yes, I think, following his Egyptian argument as far as it goes, but it was his 
work that his team was faithfully carrying out. What about their research? 
Indeed, who were they? 
If we must have an Egyptian social structure to support our Greeks, then I 
would hope that the norm for service in it would be temporary and educational, 
perhaps something like apprenticeship as a junior researcher in a scientific 
laboratory, such as one finds in biology. Good, even essential training but not a 
life for the long-term in the academic sense. Such crucially important cultural 
changes are underway for which all hands and minds are needed that we must 
not allow the digital humanities to become only, merely infrastructural. It has 
much more important work to do. Agenda item number one, I have suggested, 
is to carry forth the humane project of becoming differently human. 
  
                                                             
26  “Art is an undertaking in common, performed by solitary people” (q. Gifford 1986, 51). 
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